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JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: TIME FOR
A CHANGE?*
Philip B. Kurlandt
We live in parlous times. The accelerating rate at which constitutional crisis piles on constitutional crisis is nothing short of
terrifying. Democracy is a fragile instrumentality for the governance of a nation of such awesome dimensions as ours. We must be
constantly concerned that the fabric of our government not be
weakened to the point where it will necessarily be torn by pressures
it was not built to withstand.
The essential diffictllty is that, in times of crisis, institutional
values are quickly subordinated to considerations of personal and
party loyalties, to demands for accommodations that must properly
be labelled as acts of expediency rather than judgments of principle. At times like these we frequently ask too much of those
institutions which bear our greatest faith rather than those with the
strength, if not the will, to resolve the issues that confront us.
I have said before and I have no hesitation to say now that the
constitutional ailment from which we suffer greatly, and of which
the mess called Watergate -is our most prominent symptom-the
undue accumulation of executive power in the White House-is
too large and too important a problem to be settled by judicial
actions. However much we have become accustomed to assuming
that the basic problems of our society are justiciable, the fact
remains that none of the major ills of our society has ever been
solved by judicial action. The Supreme Court can, and indeed, has
from time to time, pointed or blocked the way. But the nation has
not always followed. A court can command individuals, largely
because there are other branches of government to enforce its
decrees and because public opinion commands them to support the
court. But when the courts direct their orders to those other
branches of government, it becomes clear why the judiciary is
properly labelled the third branch. It may, because of its detachment and the special capacity of its members, assert greater moral
* This Article was delivered as part of the fifty-sixth Frank Irvine Lecture Series at the
Cornell Law School on Ocfober 25, 1973.
t William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor in The College and Professor of Law, University of
Chicago Law School.
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force than do the political branches. But it requires no cynic to
reveal that morality-even as embodied in judicial decisions-has
not been the prime guide to government action.
This is said not to demean the proper role of the judiciary but
to describe it. The judicial branch has become the prime protector
of the rights of individuals against the impositions of government.
It is not and has not been a prime force in the allocation of
authority between legislature and executive.
Despite the impression I may have given, I have not departed
from the assignment that was made to me to discuss the business of
the Supreme Court and how reforms may be effected to assure
that its business can be properly conducted. For I would insist that
one cannot talk about the Court's business and its effective dispatch
without defining the role that the Court has to play. We cannot
decide what tasks may be assigned and assumed without knowing
how those tasks are to be performed.
Nevertheless, I concede that the issues about which I would
speak do not, at this moment, certainly, have the claim on one's
attention that is properly made by yesterday's, today's, and
tomorrow's newspaper headlines and the various worthy and unworthy actions that seem to take place daily in Washington. But it
remains true that we must properly structure our government so
that when our constitutional crises are resolved-and I devoutly
hope that they will be resolved without destruction of our system of
laws that is based on a devotion to governmental democracy and
individual freedom-we shall have a viable structure of selfgovernment based on law rather than fiat, on principle rather than
expediency, on freedom rather than efficiency.
I
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

To say that the Supreme Court does not have the ultimate
power of government is not to say that it does not have an
indispensable authority. And the question that I would now address is how to channel the Court's judicial business in such a
manner as to permit it to perform its proper function as it should
be performed.
There is a debate raging, or at least rampant, about whether
the Supreme Court's business should be curtailed and, if so, how. It
is of importance to recognize that there are two questions involved
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here, not one. The first is whether, under existing jurisdictional
and procedural standards, the Justices are so burdened as to
endanger their capacity to perform their jobs adequately. The
second is what means should be utilized to remove the undue
burden if it does exist.
Antecedent to both questions, however, is that to which I have
already alluded: what function is the Supreme Court to perform in
our present governmental system?
Any appellate court has at least three distinct functions to
perform. The first is that of correcting erroneous decisions rendered by judicial tribunals inferior to it in the judicial hierarchy.
The second is to maintain a consistency among the decisions of
those lower courts subordinate to it, so that the law is evenhandedly
applied within the system. The third is the lawmaking function of
creating and amending rules of law, not only so that they may be
followed by the lower courts within the system, but also to provide
guidance to lawyers and their clients as to the propriety of their
behavior, their obligations, their duties, their rights, and their
remedies. This last function-the lawmaking function-is the
genius of the common law system that we inherited from our
English forbears.
In the course of performing one or more of these functions,
an appellate court is called upon to give effect to the will of the
majority as expressed by the legislature of the particular jurisdiction. And it is also called upon from time to time to frustrate the
will of the majority as expressed in legislative and executive action
by keeping the executive and the legislature within the limitations
imposed by the relevant constitution.
The Supreme Court is like any appellate court in terms of the
business that it must dispatch in each of these categories. The
problem derives from the fact that it cannot perform all these
functions for all cases brought to it for review and, therefore, it
must have some mechanism for restricting its business. The Supreme Court does not act as a court of errors and appeals; it does
not sit for the purpose of curing error unless that error has serious
connotations beyond its effects on the immediate parties. Correction of error, in the federal system, is essentially the obligation of
the United States courts of appeals which must be, for most
purposes, the ultimate appellate tribunal.
To a limited extent, more limited now than it once was, the
Court still functions to unify the federal law by eliminating conflicts
of decisions about the law among the eleven courts of appeals and
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the fifty state high courts that are subject to its review. There are,
however, other avenues for correcting such inconsistent rulings of
these courts. The Congress of the United States, for example, at
least in cases involving inconsistent interpretations of its statutes,
can remove the ambiguities that give rise to such inconsistent
interpretations.'
The primary function of the Supreme Court, however, must
lie in the third of the categories that I have delineated. It must, as
everyone concedes, confine its role at least to the decision of
important cases, cases that have importance for the law as a whole
and not those that merely happen to involve large sums of money,
goods, services, or people. These important cases are largely constitutional cases and cases involving the construction of important
federal statutes.
This function ought to be performed not by instinctive votes
for one side or another, but on the basis of reasoning that at least
purports to justify the result to be reached. In the course of such
adjudication, it should be expected that the Justices will have ample
time to think about the issues and the relevant factual data, to
secure enlightenment from counsel by way of briefs and oral
argument, to engage in research themselves and through their law
clerks, and to exchange views and opinions with their brethren.
The result of such a collegial process should be an opinion, or
series of opinions, in each case that will undertake to justify the
conclusion reached in such a manner as to afford guidance to
lower courts and future litigants faced with similar but not identical
problems.
Thus, the Supreme Court is not only an arbiter of disputes,
but also the maker and remaker of laws, including the highest law
of the land, the Constitution. If the task does not seem awesome to
you, I can assure you that it is. The post of a Supreme Court
Justice is honorific, but hardly a sinecure.
II
Is

THE COURT OVERBURDENED?

The first question then is whether the Supreme Court is in fact
overburdened by the docket that it is now called upon to manage.
'E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 74 (section on prizes and awards added to clarify
judicial confusion); 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 clarifies
judicial confusion over Corrupt Practices Act).
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There are perhaps two measures that might be used to respond to
that question. One is to canvass the subjective opinions of the
Justices themselves to determine whether the Justices feel that
there is adequate opportunity to deal with the questions put to
them. On this basis we have a mixed response. In 1960, in presenting an Irvine Lecture to an audience at this law school, Mr. Justice
Douglas categorically denied that there was any excessive burden.
He said' 2 then that "the idea that the Court is overworked" is a
"myth." And, to be sure, the myriad of other activities that Mr.
Justice Douglas indulges in even while he serves on the Court is
vivid testimony that the work of the Court is not burdensome to
him. On the other hand, at the same period, when the Court was
called on to deal with a total of 1,940 cases, as compared with a
docket of 3,700 for the most recent term, Mr. Justice Stewart said:
"This work load means, I am sorry to say, that there simply is not
so much time as ideally there should be for the reflective deliberation so essential to the judicial process. 3
At the same time, we have, in addition to Mr. Justice Douglas,
the testimony of former Justice Goldberg, 4 of former Chief Justice
Earl Warren, 5 and of present Mr. Justice Brennan 6 that the Court
is fully capable of mastering its work load.
We also know that the incumbent Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Blackmun, and others now sitting believe that the Court cannot
7
perform its proper functions under its present jurisdictional load.
This too is the assertion of the Freund Committee on the basis of
8
interviews with the sitting Justices.
It may well be that the question whether the work is too
burdensome is a reflection of the differing attitudes on how the
Court is to function. And perhaps this conflict of opinions is
reflected in the positions taken in a particularly acrid debate
between Professor Henry Hart of the Harvard Law School and
2 Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 402 (1960).

Griswold, The Supreme Court-Foreword, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REv. 81, 84 (1960)
(quoting Juitice Stewart from N.Y. Times, April 10, 1960, § 1, at 41, col. 3).
4 Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-15.
5 Burger & Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends
Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 724 (1973).
6 Brennan,Justice Brennan Calls NationalCourt of Appeals Proposal "FundamentallyUnnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835, 837 (1973).
7 See A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SuPREIm
COURT (Domestic Affairs Study No. 21,
1973).
3

-$ STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

REPORT

9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as

FREUND REPORT].
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Judge Thurman Arnold. 9 It was Professor Hart's view that a
qualitative evaluation of the Court's work, as well as a statistical
analysis that showed how little time was available to the Justices to
respond to the questions placed before them, clearly demonstrated
that the Court had too much on its plate.' 0 Professor Hart concluded:
The opinions of the Justices, if one turns to them, confirm
the conclusion that the Court is trying to decide more cases than
it can decide well. Regretfully, and with deference, it has to be
said that too many of the Court's opinions are about what one
would expect could be written in twenty-four hours. There are
able opinions, to be sure, including many that have manifestly
taken much more time than that in thought and composition.
But few of the Court's opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine
the area of law with which they deal. Other opinions fail even by
much more elementary standards. Issues are ducked which in
good lawyership and good conscience ought not to be ducked.
Technical mistakes are made which ought not to be made in
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The measured judgment of two thoughtful commentators expressed two
years ago has lost none of its force in the two terms which have
elapsed since: "The Court's product has shown an. increasing
incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support them
in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine and of per
curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between
the authorities they cite and the results they decree." It needs to
be said with all possible gravity, because it is a grave thing to say,
that these failures are threatening to undermine the professional
respect of first-rate lawyers for the incumbent Justices of the
Court, and this at the very time when the Court as an institution
and the Justices who sit on it are especially in need of the bar's
confidence and support.'"
Thurman Arnold, earlier a Yale law professor, a trust-buster, a
judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but
then a partner in the celebrated firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter,
gave the back of his hand to the Hart thesis. 1 2 His position was in
effect that it was absurd to think that the Court needed time for
deliberation and consultation. For, as one of the sponsors of the

I See Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960); Hart, The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959).
10 Hart, supra note 9, at 94-100.
Id. at 100-01, quoting Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
12 See Arnold, supra note 9.
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legal realism of the 1930's, Arnold knew that judgment was not
reached by reason but by instinct and that no amount of consultation or study would have any effect on changing the, instinctive
reaction of each Justice to each problem. 1 3 My colleague, Professor
Wayne Booth, recently published a book with a title reminiscent 4of
Arnold's attitude. It is called, Now Don't Try To Reason With Me.' I
commend the book to you if not the Arnold article.
Erwin N. Griswold, then Dean of the Harvard Law School and
later Solicitor General of the United States, appropriately remarked, in respose to Arnold's piece:
Professor Hart refers to the time involved in "the maturing
of collective thought." Judge Arnold ridicules this by repeated
pejorative quotation. He even goes so far as to say: "There is no
such process as this, and there never has been; men of positive
views are only hardened in those views by such conferences." In
this, it seems to me that Judge Arnold's argument wholly fails.
Indeed, I must confess that I feel rather sorry for the outlook
reflected in his statement. My own work in the law has been an
exciting intellectual experience. I am not known for mildness of
view, or for hesitance in expressing what views I have. But many
times clearly held views of mine have been radically changed by
discussion with associates or colleagues, often people with very
different outlooks from mine. Nearly any class with Professor
Thomas Reed Powell was an experience of this sort, even though
I did not always accept all of Professor Powell's reasoning. To
me, "the maturing of collective thought' is a profound reality. I
can only express my regret that Judge Arnold has apparently not
shared in this experience, and my even greater regret that the
Supreme Court, because of pressure of time, does not have as
much opportunity for it as, in the interest of the law and of the
nation, that body should have.' 5
Is the Court overburdened? That apparently depends upon
whether you regard the Court as a deliberative body, a collegial
institution in which the Justices should pay heed to each other's
expressions, or whether it is merely a debating society, with each
Justice committed in advance to a conclusion which his law clerk
justifies by the best debater's points that occur to him.
Obviously, from what I said at the outset about my concepts of
the Supreme Court of the United States, I fall with those who share
the view that the Court cannot adequately perform its functions
properly under the burden of all of its present chores. But then,
Id. at 1312-13.
W. BOOTH, Now DON'T TRY To REASON WITH ME (1972).
15 Griswold, supra note 3, at 84-85 (citations omitted).
13

14
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Thurman Arnold, if he were still alive, would tell you that my
judgment can be attributed to the fact that I am a Frankfurter
proteg6, who is dedicated to that absurd proposition best stated,
perhaps, by Dean Roscoe Pound, when he wrote: "Civilization
involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this
6
subjection is law."'
III
REMEDIES FOR AN OVERBURDENED COURT

The remedies that might be appropriate to relieve an overburdened Court again will depend in no small measure on what
one considers the function that a Justice of the Supreme Court is
expected to serve. If one accepts the proposition that a Justice
should decide the questions presented but should leave to his law
clerks the recommendations as to which cases should be heard and
the writing of opinions in support of his judgments, then indeed
the answer to the problem of an excessive judicial load could be
answered by the addition of several more law clerks in each set of
chambers. If, however, one thinks that the decisions as to what
cases should be heard and the writing of Supreme Court opinions
are a nondelegable judicial task, the problem becomes more
difficult of resolution. I wish that I could tell you that the law clerks
do not write the opinions and do not decide on the grant or denial
of petitions for certiorari. This I cannot do. For, although I believe
that in every instance each Justice determines his own vote, I think
it true that in some, if not most, instances the opinions are not of
his hand and most votes on certiorari are based exclusively on law
clerk memos. 17 If one were to utilize the tools of modern computers, one could readily prove that in many instances the putative
author of an opinion is not, in fact, the author of that opinion.
Only if you accept the Arnold thesis, that it is only the result and
not the reasoning that counts, can one be sanguine in the face of
these facts.
For purposes of considering reforms of the Court's functions,
it is appropriate to divide the Court's business into two parts. The
first part is the review of thousands of petitions for certiorari, to
determine which cases will be called up for plenary consideration.
The second part is the disposition of those cases that the Court has
16 Pound, The Future of Law, 47 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (1937).
17 Cf.A. BICKEL, supra note 7, at 24-25; FREUND REPORT 43-45; Goldberg, supra note 4,
at 15.
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decided to decide. I put to one side the problem created by such
compulsory jurisdiction which the Court purports to retain. The
fact is that the Court doesn't seem to treat appeals any differently
from the way it treats petitions for certiorari, the congressional
mandate to the contrary notwithstanding. Moreover, everybody
seems agreed that the Court's compulsory jurisdiction should be
eliminated and that all cases should come by way of petition for
certiorari. 8 The reduction of all cases to certiorari cases, however,
will have no real effect in reducing the Court's work load.
If one looks at the statistics, it soon becomes evident that
petitions for certiorari are growing in almost geometrical proportions each decade, but the number of cases determined on the
merits remains fairly constant. 1 9 It is not surprising, therefore, that
most suggestions for relieving the undue burden on the Supreme
Court have been addressed to a reduction of the hardships imposed by the certiorari process. This has been true almost since the
Court was given its great control over its own docket. Shortly after
the enactment of the Judge's Bill in 1925 2 0 -the last major statutory reform of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction-Professor Felix
Frankfurter, as he then was, wrote of the potential failure of the
certiorari process because of the Court's inundation by certiorari
petitions:
[W]hen, as has already happened, the Court is confronted with
500 petitions at a single term, the objective standards governing
the exercise of discretion may unwittingly fail in numerous
instances. The reports make abundantly clear that because of the
quantity of these petitions and the conditions under which they
must be scrutinized, they are sometimes granted when they
should have been denied. Is it not likely, too, that petitions are
occasionally denied when they should be granted? Their disposition rests inescapably upon judgment, and it is familiar experience that
judgment is less sure in the later stages of a long
2
series. 1
Frankfurter was sanguine, however, about the availability of a
cute for such a defect:
[I]f the present number continues or increases, experiment
might show that more effective scrutiny would be secured if
petitions for certiorari were assigned for reporting to individual
members of the Court, as is true in writing opinions. Eventually,
See FREUND REPORT 25-26 and authorities cited therein.
See id. Table III, Certiorari Cases at A3.
20 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229,43 Stat. 936 (codified in various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
21 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 287 (1927).
18
19
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also, the bar might be educated to conserve the Courts time by
withholding unmeritorious petitions. In any event, the difficulties
that experience may disclose
are within the control of the Court's
22
own flexible procedure.
In 1958, Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the Cardozo Lecture at
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He, too, was
concerned about the growth of petitions for certiorari. He was less
hopeful, however, that the Court could solve the difficulties by its
own devices:
While it can therefore be said that the certiorari work, despite its
continuing growth, is still within manageable proportions [in the
1957 Term there had been 1462 petitions acted upon], it would
be shortsighted and unwise not to recognize that preserving the
certiorari system in good health, and in proper balance with the
other work of the Court, are tasks that will increasingly demand
thoughtful and imaginative attention. As I have tried to show,
the essence of the problem as things stand today is to guard

against wasteful encroachments upon the Court's time by preventing an increase in, if not reducing, the volume of improvident applications for certiorari. Frankly, I doubt whether much
can be accomplished towards this end through the administrative
processes of the Court itself. The two administrative devices
which most obviously suggest themselves as means for dealing
with the situation, namely, to have petitions for certiorari disposed of by some procedure short of action by the full Court, or
to impose a special cost penalty upon those filing patently
improvident petitions, would seem to be either unacceptable or
unworkable. The first would be objectionable because anything
less than action as a unit would be foreign to the ways in which
the Court has always functioned, and is hardly compatible with
the proper discharge of its responsibilities as the Nation's highest
judicial tribunal. The second would probably be impractical
because of the well-known reluctance of American judges to put
obstacles in the way of access to the courts, no matter how
ill-advised a litigant's actions may be, and because such a rule
3
would be especially difficult to administer in this instance.
Mr. Justice Harlan concluded with the proposition that selfimposed restraint by members of the bar would be the best means
of cutting down improvident applications for certiorari. He
reached this conclusion, despite his earlier statement that "if a
lawyer cannot assess with some degree of confidence the imponderables involved it is quite understandable that he should conceive
it to be his duty to try for certiorari. 2 4
22
23
24

Id. at 289.
J. HARLAN,
Id. at 16.

MANNING THE

Dimas 27-28 (1958).
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The most recent and certainly the most controversial suggestion for relief of the Court's docket is also directed to the "certiorari problem." The Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of
the Supreme Court, more commonly known as the Freund Report
after the name of its illustrious chairman, suggested that some of the
certiorari business could be sloughed off on another court to be
created for the purpose. In its own summary, the Report calls for:
The establishment by statute of a National Court of Appeals,
with a membership of seven judges drawn on a rotating basis
from the federal courts of appeals and serving staggered three
year terms. This Court would have the twofold function of (1)
screening all petitions for certiorari and appeals that would at
present be filed in the Supreme Court, referring the most
review-worthy (perhaps 400 or 450 per Term) to the Supreme
Court (except as provided in clause 2), and denying the rest; and
(2) retaining for decision on the merits cases of genuine conflict
between circuits (except those of special moment, which would be
certified to the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court would
determine which of the cases thus referred to it should be
granted review and decided on the merits in the Supreme Court.
The residue would be denied, or in some instances
be remanded
25
for decision by the National Court of Appeals.
Once the present Chief Justice Burger seemed to put his
imprimatur on the proposal 2 6 -he never really has-the battle over
it became as fierce as could be expected from so dry a subject.
Former Chief Justice Warren became captain of the other side and
the law reviews and journals soon rang with denunciation and
counterdenunciation

27

Much of the attack was emotional rather than reasoned. This is
not to say that the Freund Report should be adopted, but rather
that the reasons against it have savoured of the ipse dixit. Such
arguments were advanced by eminent authorities as that, and I
quote, "Power once lodged in a given court must be totally retained, not divided, not delegated. 23 When one asks, why must
power once lodged in a given court "be totally retained, not
divided, not delegated"? he gets no answer. This same pair of
authorities tells us, with the same adequacy of reason, that "the
power to decide cases presupposes the power to determine what
cases will be decided." 29 Again, one is inclined to ask why, espe25 FREUND REPORT 47.

26 Cf. Burger & Warren, supra note 5, at 721-24.
217See id. at 724-30; Brennan, supra note 6.
28 Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 485

(1973) (quoting with approval from Arthur Goldberg).
29 Id.

at 484.
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cially in light of the fact that the Constitution assigns to Congress
the function of defining the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
and that it was not until 1916 that wide certiorari jurisdiction was
conferred on the Supreme Court. A third argument has even more
illustrious support. Both Mr. Justice Harlan3" and Judge Henry
Friendly 3' have pointed out that this is not the way it has been
done in the past and the wisdom of the past should be good
enough for the present.
The third argument has validity not because we must continue
to do things the way that we have done them in the past. Its validity
rests on the fact that if change is to be brought about, the Freund
Committee has not met the burden of proving that its proposal is
the best alternative for solving the problem. I shall return to this
proposition shortly.
The esence of the complaint against the Freund Report is that
somehow it threatens to reduce the powers that have been- exercised by the Supreme Court. The notion is that by delegating to
other judges the selection of the four hundred and fifty-odd
petitions for Supreme Court consideration, the Court will be
turned from its libertarian bent, that it will be deprived of its
opportunities to amend earlier positions, and that it will lose the
opportunity for self-education in the highways and byways of the
law, an education it is supposed to get from reading all the
thousands of petitions that are now assigned to it. The chief
argument, however, is that the power totally to choose among the
cases proferred should not be delegated.
I should feel more sympathy for the criticism if it were based
on fact. But the winnowing of the cases for judicial determination
on petitions for certiorari has already been delegated by most of
the Justices to their law clerks. With few exceptions, among whom
Mr. Justice Brennan may be numbered, the Justices rely for their
judgments on certiorari on one-page memoranda with a recommendation for grant or denial. Indeed, some of the Justices have
pooled their law clerks so that each of the participating Justices is
relying on the flimsy report of one law clerk who more often than
not will not be his own clerk. If the essential question raised by the
Freund Report is, as some of its critics would have it, whether it
better comports with the dignity and power of the Court to
delegate the resolution of the certiorari petitions to law clerks than
to courts of appeals judges, I expect that each of us will have his
own answer. I know what mine is.
30 J. HARLAN, supra

31 H.

note 23, at 27-28.

FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

A

GENERAL VIEW

50-51 (1973).
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Perhaps my personal bias is showing. As one who works pretty
hard to fashion a petition for certiorari, sometimes with rather
subtle arguments and appeals to the prejudices of individual Justices, I am resentful of the fact that my petition will not be read by
members of the high court, that they will see only what their law
clerks permit them to see. That such a carefully prepared brief
should be so quickly reduced to pap before it can be consumed by
those for whom it is intended hardly affords incentive for the kinds
of briefs that the Court insists .it wants.
It is only more recently that serious proposals have been put
forth for relieving the Court docket by means other than amendment of the certiorari process. Essentially these call for a reduction
of the Court's authority to deal with certain kinds of cases, i.e.,
32
there would be a subject-matter limitation on the Court's docket.
Usually, these are joined with suggestions for the creation of an
alternative forum or forums in which cases that could not be
brought to the Supreme Court would be considered. 33 Thus, a few
years ago, I suggested that the time had come when the business of
the Court could properly be restricted to constitutional issues, with
statutory questions to be taken elsewhere for consideration. 3 4 Despite Judge Friendly's statement that "it is scarcely possible to
engage in deep constitutional contemplation all day long, '35 I am
still enamored of my own idea. I should ask Judge Friendly, to
what better use could the Justices put their time than the serious,
day-long contemplation of constitutional issues? But I am not so
self-deluded as to suggest that the subject-matter limitation that I
advocate is the certain or only answer.
Those of you who have attended earlier lectures in this series,
are aware of the cogency of the argument for removing the
criminal law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to another tribunal.
And there are additional alternatives that I would suggest merit
consideration. One could, I submit, remove the tax jurisdiction, the
review of certain administrative agencies, and certainly the diversity of citizenship cases, without damaging the interests of law or
justice.
The essential difficulty that I have with the Freund Report is
that it dismisses all the other possibilities for diminishing the
32

See

"

Id.

FREUND REPORT 10.

at 11.

'4 Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less and Explain More, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1968, § 6
(Magazine), at 34.
15 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 31, at 51.
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Court's burden without explicit examination of them. Certainly, it
should not have been so cavalier in its rejections without a statistical
survey revealing exactly what the content of the Court's certiorari
business is. The ex cathedra arguments of the Freund Committee
are no more persuasive than those of its attackers.
IV
SOME BAND-AID RELIEF

I suppose it ill-behooves one honored by this lectureship
simply to be critical of the suggestions of others. I do have, in
addition to my earlier suggestion about limiting the Supreme Court
to its constitutional function, a limitation that seems to have worked
fairly well under the West German Constitution, 36 a few suggestions for internal experiments for the Court to indulge in limiting
its business.
Before I list these for you, let me endorse-even if it is an act
of supererogation-Judge Friendly's proposal that essentially the
amount of certiorari business that will be imposed on the Supreme
Court will be largely determined by the amount of business funneled through the court of appeals. Thus, unless that flood can be
abated, there is no hope of saving the Supreme Court from resort
to the procedures of other high courts, the affirmance and reversal
of lower court cases without any reasons whatsoever being given
for the judgments.
I would point out, too, that in large measure the heavy burden
on the Supreme Court is one of its own creation. It has accomplished this essentially in two ways. First, it has continued to take
for review the odd case as to which experienced lawyers would say
that its chances for certiorari were not different from that of the
proverbial "snowball in hell." It has thereby encouraged the filing
of worthless petitions that occupy its time without adequate reason.
Second, the Supreme Court has nationalized so much of American
law that a very large part of the Court's business is now concerned
with matters that would once have been the exclusive concern of
the state judiciary. All libel law is now constitutional law; 37 the
category of the federal common law is open-ended; expansive
" See generally Rupp, The Federal ConstitutionalCourt in Germany: Scope of its Jurisdiction
and Procedure, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 584 (1969).
37See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Note, Times Marches On:
The Courts' Continuing Expansios" of the Application of the "Actual Malice" Standard, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 153 (1971).
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construction of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has turned
corporation law into a federal speciality;3 8 and these are but examples. Moreover, the Court has created a multitude of claims and
remedies, sometimes on the remnants of quiescent statutes, sometimes without them, with the result that the lower federal courts,
and therefore the Supreme Court, have multiplied their business to
the point where the Court must feel somewhat like the sorcerer's
apprentice.
If the undue burden is one of the Court's own creation, it is,
nevertheless, not one likely to be dissolved quickly. And I should
like to conclude with some suggestions for Supreme Court experimentation with its own docket, experimentation that can be
engaged solely at the Court's discretion and without the need for
legislation. Let me concede the modesty of my goals, for I offer
only palliatives and not cures.
1. The burden of having each Justice consider each of the
almost four thousand petitions for review to come before the Court
can be reduced in accordance with a suggestion made by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter almost fifty years ago. He suggested that individual Justices would have to take responsibility for recommending
whether a petition be granted or denied.3 9 1 should be prepared to
go further. Since the problem of petitions for certiorari inhere not
only in their numbers but in the fact that more petitions are
granted than should be, I would suggest that the total group of
petitions be arbitrarily divided into nine parts, each of which would
be assigned to a Justice. I would have the understanding that the
Justice receiving the petition should have authority to grant a
proportionate number as he decides best, but not more than say
fifteen each. Thereafter, the entire Court could dismiss as improvidently granted any case thus brought before it in which five
Justices think that the petition was erroneously granted. I suggest
that a single Justice who himself reads the petitions and makes the
decision may be a better agent for this function than either the
Freund Committee's delegation to an inferior tribunal or than the
existing system by which the petitions for certiorari fall so heavily
into the hands of the law clerks for determination.
2. I should have the Court decide and publicly announce that,
for a given period of time, there are certain categories of cases that
it will no longer review. Clearly it should be prepared to abandon
38

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); SEC Rule

10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
39 F.
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.supra note 21, at 289.
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diversity of citizenship cases in which petitions for certiorari are
almost automatically denied now. It could choose among the other
subject matter areas for similar rules that will govern its members
in determining whether certiorari is available.
3. Much of the blame for the undue burden of certiorari
petitions is placed on counsel who file such petitions with the
knowledge that the case will not get to the high court unless
Homer nods. The Court has refused to countenance the notion
that only a specially qualified lawyer will be permitted to file
petitions and has been equally adamant against imposing costs of
any substantial amount against a party or his counsel who files a
flimsy petition. In the absence of a .distinct Supreme Court bar of
experienced practitioners, it might be well to make public the
Court's disposition of these grossly inadequate petitions. For some
time, the Court has maintained a "dead list," a list of petitions with
such an obvious lack of merit that no consideration will be given to
them. If it were to publish such a dead list, along with the names of
counsel who filed the cases, the bar would be educated as to the
kind of case that the Court considers below its dignity to accept and
the imposing lawyers might feel appropriately chastised by the
publicity accorded their efforts.
4. The Court should abandon not its practice of multiple
opinions, as some have suggested, but rather its practice of unduly
lengthy opinions. Following some bad examples of the past, which
include my revered mentor Felix Frankfurter, the Court has taken
to attenuated opinions of extraordinary length that lead not to
enlightenment but to obfuscation of the Court's true positions. It is
not necessary or desirable to publish a law review article or an
A.L.R. note every time a major case is decided. It should suffice if
the real reasons for the Court's conclusions are delineated without
the publication of the contents of a law clerk's research which may
conceal rather than reveal the true bases of the Court's judgments.
I have little or no doubt that an effective editor could reduce the
recent pages of the United States Reports by fifty percent or more
without losing an iota of substance. Perhaps the Court doesn't have
the necessary time to write short opinions and, therefore, has to
write long ones. In that event, it must cut down the number of
cases granted review each term.
I have facetiously suggested that the answer to this problem
would be the discharge of all law clerks and the requirement that
every Justice confine his opinion to two thousand words. The more
I hear myself talk, the more I am convinced that this would be a
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step in the right direction toward more meaningful, and shorter,
Supreme Court opinions.
5. I would suggest, too, that the petition for certiorari be
combined with a brief on the merits. These should, of course, be
separate arguments,, but physically joined together so that the
Court could more readily reach argument on the merits, if certiorari is granted and a plenary hearing is required. That procedure would also make it possible for quick disposal on the merits of
some cases where oral argument is not required or where a short
memorandum opinion is all that is necessary to dispose of the case.
6. Finally, I should suggest that the Court ban amici curiae
briefs, including those filed by the Solicitor General. *The practice
of such briefs, which usually serve only the function of demonstrating to the Court that a group of its constituents demands a
particular result, has been growing at a rapid rate. The Court is
thus burdened with briefs that almost always raise and present no
new arguments or insights but merely repeat what the parties'
briefs have already shown. Besides, the process of lobbying a court,
which is the primary role of such briefs, is unseemly. If those who
would file these briefs are amici, they are amici not of the Court
but of one of the parties. Certainly they can convey to those whom
they support any ideas or arguments of which the parties themselves have not thought, which could be incorporated in the parties'
briefs if they deemed it desirable. Certainly the Court has enough
reading matter to guide it to decision without the thousands of
additional pages of type represented by amici briefs each term.
CONCLUSION

I said that all that I have to offer here is temporary relief of a
minor nature. The virtue of my suggestions, if they have any, is
that they can be effected by the Court without the need for any
legislative action. But I do not mean to suggest that we need not
still search for a more permanent cure. That cure must, however,
be based on solid proof of its potential for relief and not, as was the
Freund Report, based solely on the opinions of some experts that
their proposed system was the best system. Maybe the Freund
proposal will yet prove to be the best one. But we cannot make that
determination in advance of knowledge of the facts supporting its
case as compared with the facts supporting the alternative solutions
proferred by others.
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Meanwhile we should not overlook Judge Friendly's demonstration that the Court's burden is a result of the mushrooming
business of the lower federal courts which must, somehow, be
stunted. Nor should we disregard Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum:
"Fit legislation and fair adjudication are attainable. The ultimate
reliance of society for the proper fulfilment of both these august
functions is to entrust them only to those who are equal to their
demands. 4 0
40
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